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To regulate the refinancing of listed companies and protect the interests of the 
investors, regulators have modified the refinancing and related institutions for many 
times. So the regulatory environment of listed firms has been in a relatively dynamic 
change.However, all the restrictions on refinancing qualifications induce them to meet 
the policy requirements through earnings management.This paper will explore the 
earnings management of SEO listed firms from a perspective of Institutional change. 
Most empirical research is based upon accrual-based earnings management.Later, 
several researchers overseas began to find real activities management around SEOs, 
which few domestic researchers study.And domestic researches mainly study a short   
sample statically,which can not find the dynamic change of earnings management 
with Institutional change,and economic consequences of them are also inconsistent. 
This paper will explore all the three types of SEO and consider below- the-line, 
accrual-based and real earnings management together. I hope that the crude remarks 
in this paper can make a little contribution to this field. Firstly,it,for the first 
time,studies the earnings management from the perspective of Institutional change. 
Again,it enriches the studies on earnings management around SEOs.Otherwise,these 
results provide some reference to related policy and the investor's investment. 
The empirical analysis in this paper test the following hypotheses.Firstly,we 
investigate whether listed firms alter earnings management methods around SEOs 
with Institutional change.Secondly, we examine whether the economic consequences 
the accrual-based and real earnings management cause after SEO are the same.Lastly, 
we wonder how different earnings management behaviors around Private Placement 
to three types of purchaser are.We find that earnings management behaviors around 
SEOs indeed change with Institutional change.The economic consequences of 
accrual-based and real earnings management around SEOs are also different. 
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年 2 月 25 日和 3 月 15 日，证监会相继出台了《上市公司新股发行管理办法》和
《关于做好上市公司新股发行工作的通知》，其中对 ROE 的计算方法做了新的规
定，即将扣除非经常性损益后的净利润与扣除前相比，以低者作为计算依据。对
于公开增发，证监会是于 2002 年 7 月 24 日颁布实施的《关于上市公司增发新股
























影响已经被众多的跨国比较文献所证实(La Porta et al,1997 [8]等)。而股权再融资
方面，Cohen et al.（2008）[9]发现，在萨班斯-奥克斯利法案颁布之后，管理者放
弃会计操纵，转而采用基于实际经营活动的盈余管理。本文也试图研究监管政策


































































































































种盈余管理方式，如：Barnea et al. (1976)[15]、McVay(2006)[16]等。鉴于我国在会
计准则、制度等方面存在不同的国情，下面主要介绍国内的相关研究。 












著高于其他公司。Chen andYuan(2004)[14]；Haw et al.（2005）[20]都发现了配股公
司为迎合监管部门的要求而利用 “线下项目”操纵盈余的证据。Chen and 
Yuan(2004)
[14]以我国 1996～1998 年间实施配股的公司为样本（该期间的配股政
                                                        
② 财政部于 2000 年发文《关于进一步认真贯彻落实国务院<关于纠正地方自行制定税收先征后返政策的通
知>的通知》，各地区自行制定的税收先征后返政策，从 2000 年 1 月 1 日起一律停止执行（其中企业所得税
















策对 ROE 的要求是最近三年每年都在 10%以上），用行业中位值调整后的经净资
产标准化的非经常性利润指标衡量线下项目操纵程度，发现经常性 ROE 小于 10 
%的公司的该指标显著高于经常性 ROE 大于或等于 10%的公司，并且前者投资
收益占净资产的比重显著高于后者，证明我国当时“10%现象”的存在性，即上市
公司为达到配股资格而通过非正常的损益项目操纵盈余。Haw et al.（2005）[20]
同样发现在 1996～1998 年间，我国上市公司管理者成功地利用了涉及“线下项目” 
（在我国企业的利润表中，具体是指营业外收支、补贴收入等项目）的交易（同
时还有应计项目操纵）来达到监管者部门对于配股收益指标的要求。  






政策分别于 2001 年、2002 年改变了 ROE 的计算方法，即扣除非经常性损益后
的净利润与扣除前相比，以低者作为计算依据。那这些政策的出台，有没有对之
后再融资公司的线下项目操纵行为起到一定的遏制作用？本文会对此进行检验。 

































Teoh、Welch and Wong(1998)[10]；DuCharme、Malatesta and Sefcik(2004)[23]
等认为，上市公司在配股、公开增发新股前会通过提高可操控性应计利润向上操
纵盈余，误导投资者，从而提高股票的发行价格。其中，Ducharme、Malatesta and 
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